Appendix I: 
(Volume II)
Additional Quotes on Prescription demonstrating its Legal Importance
Prescription, in spite of being an important natural law for all times and all ages, is not terribly known or understood by the general public. As a direct result, hundreds of phony regal imposters and con artists have been able to emerge and falsely proclaim themselves to be royals and take advantage of innocent unsuspecting people.
Prescription is the only ancient and modern law in existence that enables a deposed royal house or exiled government to preserve, maintain and perpetuate the highest secular right on earth -- the supreme right to rule and govern a territory. But if it is neglected for a certain time period of time, it permanently terminates these rights.
The following quotes were taken out of the text during editing, but like the footnotes, they are considered important to be bear witness to the importance and reality of this law.
A right . . . of sovereignty, which, barred by prescription to the one abandoning [the former regal house], is acquired for the possessor [the usurping subsequent government that is now legitimized]. . . .[1]
Rights are lost by prescription from presumed abandonment. . . .[2]
When we say, that things may be acquired by prescription, we must be understood to mean, not only corporeal, but likewise incorporeal things. Jurisdiction or sovereignty may be acquired in this manner, as well as land or moveable goods.[3]
The doctrine of prescription and acquiescence:
Display of authority by the one party, acquiescence in that display by the other Party -- those are the sine qua non of acquisitive prescription.[4]
Sine qua non means absolutely essential or indispensable elements. Thus two things are absolutely necessary for the prescriptive transfer of rights to occur: (1) a sovereign display of authority over a claim, and (2) tacit neglect or abandonment on the part of the former ruler or exiled government.
[Acquiescence] . . . is founded upon the . . . inference fairly [and justly] to be drawn from his silence and neglect [that] . . . his intention [is] to relinquish it.[5]
Acquisitions . . . [are] founded on a presumed abandonment or desertion of a former sovereign, and by great lapse of time. . . .[6]
An abandonment of property or a right divests the title and ownership of the owner as fully and completely as would a conveyance.[7]
[Samuel] Pufendorf . . . rejects the [hereditary] claims of sovereigns for territories which once belonged to their predecessors but which, for a long time, have been under the uncontested [that is, unprotested] sovereignty of another power.[8] (emphasis added)
Yet dispossessed sovereignty can go on forever:
. . . The permanence of sovereignty is guarded [preserved] by the principle that even the overthrow of a dynasty does not immediately destroy its rights, which may be merely oppressed, suspended, held in abeyance, impaired, in short, in many degrees, and only by the verdict of time [by the rules of prescription] . . . are finally abrogated [abolished or done away with]. . . . [In other words] the rights of a [deposed] dynasty, however ancient, however celebrated, however illustrious [can be] annulled, extinguished, as if they had never been [or never existed].[9]
. . . The right of the former owner of [sovereign] title is extinguished.[10]
. . . Under the law of nature, sovereigns have duties as well as rights . . . and that the rights of sovereigns are forfeited when their duties are neglected . . . .[11]
In legal terms, the principle is:
VIGILANTIBUS ET NON DORMIENTIBUS JURA SUBVENIUNT. A maxim meaning “The laws assist the diligent, and not those who sleep upon their rights.”[12]
This law was recognized as being so profoundly important that:
For public peace and tranquility being the chief end of civil government, by the law of nations, prescription, when of so long standing, hath been always allowed to give a right.[14]
If a deposed royal house does this, they lose ". . . only the actual possession . . . and consequently preserves the right to do everything not implied by possession."[15]
Prescription is a form of acquisition that entails the possession of territory over a long, continuous period resulting in the possessor having title to the said territory. Certain important caveats must be established, however, when a state is claiming territory under this mode. First, the territory in question must be res nullius and must be "obtained either unlawfully or in circumstances where the legality of acquisition cannot be demonstrated." Second, the possession must be made public, that is to say, there must be widespread awareness, and possession should be peaceful and uninterrupted. Third, and more important, the time period should be sufficiently long to allow either acquisitive and extinctive prescription to be effective and "the implied consent of the former sovereign to the new state of affairs. This means that protests by the dispossessed sovereign may completely block any prescriptive claim. Acquiescence, therefore, is essential in a prescriptive claim.[16]
There can be no doubt that from one point of view the recognition of title, by prescription is as important in international law as it is in the municipal law of the several states.[17]
Textor made it clear that, ". . . Prescription [is] required [that is, it is a must] for [legitimately] acquiring a Kingdom or territory or province."[18] (emphasis added)
. . . Usurped rule can become legitimate rule . . . by prescription and acquisition of the rule to rule from the former ruler, if this former ruler has not exercised his rule effectively [didn’t protest as a deposed sovereign] or can otherwise be presumed to have abandoned it.[19]
". . . All titles [royal or otherwise] terminate [or end] in Prescription. . ." for those guilty of negligence.[20]
In other words, sovereign privileges are gained by long possession ". . . 'Prescription' . . . [is] in practice the most important criteria [on earth] to legitimise the State, irrespective of its origins."[21]
". . . This kind of prescription . . . is of great importance in international law. . . ."[22] Speaking of the English throne in the early 1700’s, the following citation expresses the fact that there is a constitutional connection between some of the most important and vital values of all mankind:
. . . By humane laws, long possession [under prescriptive rules] may take away [a neglectful royal family’s] right[s who have abandoned them]. . . .[23]
. . . The principle of prescription is indispensable in the interests . . . and the assurance of peace.[24]
Prescription is the moral and legal expression of a natural process, necessary to civilized life, by which stability and order are eventually restored after disruptions have taken place.[25]
Any forcefully acquired sovereign authority may have after some time transform into [a legitimate] sovereign authority. . . . Thus usurped rule can become legitimate rule, not because of the original unjust act of the usurpation, but because of . . . prescription and acquisition of right to rule from the former ruler, if [that is] this former ruler can be presumed to have abandoned it.[26]
Prescription is a mode of establishing title to territory which is subject to the sovereignty of another State (not terra nullius) through peaceful exercise of de facto sovereignty over a long period of time. It is the legitimization of a doubtful title by the passage of time and the presumed acquiescence of the former sovereignty. It differs from occupation. It relates to territory which has previously been under the sovereignty of another State. However, both modes are similar since they require evidence of sovereignty acts by a State over a period of time.
A title by prescription to be valid under International Law, it is required that the length of time must be adequate, and the public and peaceful exercise of de facto sovereignty must be continuous. The Possession of Claimant State must be public, in the sense that all interested States can be made aware of it. It must be peaceful and uninterrupted in the sense that the former sovereign must consent to the new sovereign. Such consent may be express or implied from all the relevant circumstances. This means that protests of whatever means by the former sovereign may completely block any claim of prescription.[27]
"It is important to understand the role that prescription and adverse possession played throughout medieval [and modern] times. . . ." because prescription can ". . . override a formal title to sovereignty."[28] That is, it has legal dominion over the royal rights of all deposed houses that fail to maintain their regal entitlements as well as valid exiled governments who give up their claims by acquiescence or negligence.
". . . It is incontestable that the abandonment [of royal rights through neglect] may be presumed [lost to the deposed and gained by the usurper], in case of a very long possession [50 to 100 years by the subsequent government, because the rights to the nation were] not contested or interrupted."[29] The point is, ". . . by the law of nations, prescription, when of so long standing, hath been always [in other words, invariably been] allowed to give a right," that is, the full sovereign right to rule to the usurping or subsequent government and creates a permanent loss of all regalities for the dispossessed nation.[30]
"Prescription is of necessary application, indispensable to international law, if we wish to avoid interminable disputes about the formation and existence of all States."[31] (emphasis added)
". . . In regard to prescription . . . it is authorized by the opinion and usage of the majority of countries, and is a favorable presumption, leading to the belief that this right evidently has its foundation in some principle of natural law."[32]
". . . The papacy had gained control over the Western Empire by usurpation, its rights had been made legitimate by four hundred years prescription."[33]
. . . The origin [beginning] and cessation of rights is [controlled by] prescription (Verjährung). This [fact] is deeply rooted in the essence of law. . . . Prescription . . . has its effect in many areas . . . for example, the adverse possession (Ersitzung) of property, real rights, regalia [the rights and powers of a monarch -- royal privileges], . . . the (German-legal) acquisition of a higher rank through exercise into the third generation, the (factually valid) eventual legitimation of a usurped throne. . . . The duration of prescription . . . regarding rights of a public character [is] . . . the length of three generations [or 100 years].[34]
The rule, long settled and never doubted by this Court, is that long acquiescence by one state in the possession of territory by another and in the exercise of sovereignty and dominion over it is conclusive of the latter's title and rightful authority. Indiana v. Kentucky, 136 U. S. 479, 136 U. S. 509; Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U. S. 503, 148 U. S. 522-524; Louisiana v. Mississippi, 202 U. S. 1, 202 U. S. 53; Maryland v. West Virginia, 217 U. S. 1, 217 U. S. 40, 217 U. S. 44; Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 4 How. 591, 45 U. S. 639; Missouri v. Iowa, 7 How. 660, 48 U. S. 677; New Mexico v. Colorado, 267 U. S. 30, 267 U. S. 40-41. [35]
". . . All titles [including dynastic ones] terminate [or end] in Prescription. . . ."[36]
From the first attempt to codify international law in 1795 under ". . . General Principles of the Law of Nations," we read, "(11) Possession from time immemorial creates among nations the right to prescription."[37]
[1] Christian Wolff (Freiherr von), Jus Gentium Methodo Scientifica Pertractatum, [1764] vol. 2, no. 358, 1934, p. 185.
[2] Ibid.
[3] Thomas Rutherforth, Institutes of Natural Law: Being the Substance of a Course of Lectures on Grotius De jure Belli Pacis, 2nd ed. chapter 8, no. 5, 1832, p. 65.
[4] D.H.N. Johnson, “Acquisitive Prescription in International Law,” British Year Book of International Law, vol. 27, 1950, pp. 332, 345.
[5] Henry Wheaton, Elements of International Law, vol. 1, 1836, p. 206.
[6] "Excerpts from the Convention between Great Britain and Spain, relative to America, signed at London July 5, 1786," British and Foreign State Papers 1852-1853, vol. 42, 1864, p. 199.
[7] West Group, Corpus Juris Secundum, vol. 1, no. 12, 1985, p. 19.
[8] Samuel Pufendorf, On the Law of Nature and Nations, issue 17, vol. 2, Walter Simons, ed., 1934, p. ii.
[9] "The New French Dynasty," The Metropolitan: a Monthly Magazine, devoted to Religion, Education and Literature, and General Information, vol. 2, no. 1, February 1854, p. 41.
[10] Robert Y. Jennings, The Acquisition of Territory in International Law, 1963, p. 21.
[11] Orestes Augustus Brownson, The Works of Orestes A. Brownson, vol. 11, Henry F. Brownson, ed., 1884, p. 85.
[12] William Mack, Cyclopedia of Law and Procedure, vol. 40, 1912, p. 206.
[13] Henry Wheaton, Elements of International Law, vol. 1, 1836, p. 206.
[14] Alan Butler, The Lives of the Fathers, Martyrs and Other Principal Sainsts, vol. 5, St. Augustine, May 26, note (b), 1799, p. 376.
[15] Guglielmo Ferrero, The Reconstruction of Europe, 1941, p. 140.
[16] Daniel K. Gibran, The Falklands War: Britain Versus the Past in the South Atlantic, 1998, p. 32 and D. H. Johnson, "Acquisitive Prescription in International Law," British Yearbook of International Law, vol. 27, 1950, pp. 343-348.
[17] Charles G. Fenwick, International Prescription, 4th ed., 1965, p. 421.
[18] Johann Wolfgang Textor, Synopsis of the Law of Nations, chapter 9, no. 24.
[19] Christoph A. Stumpf, The Grotian Theology of International Law, 2006, p. 189.
[20] Edmund Burke, Works of Edmund Burke, vol. 9, 2005, pp. 449-450.
[21] Joaquin Varela Suanzes, "Sovereignty in British Legal Doctrine," Murdoch University Electronic Journal of Law, vol. 6, no. 3, September 1999, #100.
[22] Robert Yewdall Jennings, The Acquisition of Territory in International, 1963, p. 21.
[23] Sir Robert Filmer, Patriarcha and Other Political Works, Peter Laslett, ed., 2009, p. 232.
[24] Pasquale Fiore, International Law Codified and its Sanction or the Legal Organization of the Society of States, Edwin N. Borchard, trans., 1918, p. 429.
[25] John Dunn and Ian Harris, Hume, vol. 2, 1997, p. 592.
[26] Christoph A. Stumpf, The Grotian Theology of International Law: Hugo Grotius and the Moral Foundations International Relations, 2006, p. 189.
[27] Dr. Walid Absulrahim Professor of Law, 6. State Territory and Territorial Sovereignty; 2015: https://sites.google.com/site/walidabdulrahim/home/my-studies-in-english/6-state-territory-and-territorial-sovereignty.
[28] Enrico Milano, Unlawful Territorial Situations in International Law: Reconciling Effectiveness, Legality and Legitimacy, 2006, p. 57, 88.
[29] A. G. Hoffter, The International Law of Europe, 8th ed., F. Heinrich Geffcken, ed., no 3, section 12, 1888.
[30] Alan Butler, The Lives of the Fathers, Martyrs and Other Principal Saints, vol. 5, St. Augustine, May 26, note (b), 1799, p. 376.
[31] Pradier-Foderé (1827-1904), a prominent French juirist, as quoted in Case of Venezuela in the Question of Boundary Between Venezuela and British Guana, vol 2, 1898, p. 27.
[32] Bearbeirac as quoted in Henry Wager Halleck ,International Law: Or, Rules Regulating the Intercourse of States in Peace and War, 1861, p. 243.
[33] Constantin Fasolt, Past Sense — Studies in Medieval and Early Modern European History, 2014, p. 365.
[34] Friedrich Julius Stah, Principles of Law: the Doctrine of Law and State on the Basis of the Christian World-View, Book 2, Ruben Alvarado, ed., 2007, pp. 107-108.
[35] United State Supreme Court, Michigan v. Wisconsin 270 U.S. 295, 1926.
[36] Edmund Burke, Works of Edmund Burke, vol. 9, p. 449, 2005, p. 450.
[37] Edmund Jan Osmañczyk, "Law of Nations, Gregoire's Principles, 1795," Encyclopedia of the United Nations and International Agreements: G to M, vol. 2, 3rd ed., Anthony Mango, ed., 2003, p. 1280.
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